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For the German Foreign Minister.

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with Pol. VIII

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4 October 1941.

As I have stated in my last report, the Japanese-American negotiations seem to be without result, unless the United States fundamentally changes her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do. However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, there remains in JAPAN, a certain sense of uncertainty as to what policy should be adopted in JAPAN. For the first time in her history JAPAN feels herself physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her forces on militarily inferior CHINA; now she is under the impression, despite brilliant individual successes, that she cannot successfully terminate this conflict by military means. Even more than this feeling prevailing within the country, the long drawn out service behind the front /Efappendienst/ has probably impaired the Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help feeling that the mobilization, begun in July, has enhanced the sense of weakness by bringing to light the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and see, the goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army Leaders (Minister for War, Chief of General Staff, Head of the Political Section and of the Section for Foreign Armies) the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at.

(The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to bring about a new distribution of power in EUROPE and the Far East by overpowering the British Empire. Keeping

...ERICA at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could only be mere means to this end.)

Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and has carried it through militarily successful to a great extent the important thing is to reestablish the connection of the powers of the Tripartite Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, and to concentrate the entire energy on fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far East as well as on the British Isles. Operations in European RUSSIA had demonstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION have suffered defeat but that the political collapse of the regime does not automatically follow. (Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring, unless a moral collapse of the regime comes about. The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after the occupation of MOSCOW, to induce the remainder of RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this. JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and east during next spring for which JAPAN would then be in a position/to do this/ despite having the CHINA conflict on her hands. In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time.

Military actions by JAPAN against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South are independent of the time of year. It is to be endeavored to link /them/ up with a German drive against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Middle East, although there is no absolute necessity to wait /for it/. However, victory over the British Empire would be complete only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Indian position.

With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly show the attitude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not

too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military Attaches in the impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, the calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does not guarantee the success of a southward push beyond initial conquests. In French... (one group garbled)...only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic leadership deprives the Japanese fighting forces of the assurance which is essential to success. It is therefore to be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive.

The activation of JAPAN in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be brought about by demonstrating to her technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common goal (passage through SIBERIA or a combined attack in the Middle East or the Far East). A long-distance flight from the Russian front to MANCHULI as soon as this is technically possible, would probably make a deep impression here. Considering the formalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are otherwise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem.

In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no mention was made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find out that in military considerations they were almost completely setting aside or ignoring the possible intervention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy. Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting entangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen. The Japanese Government /Staats-
fvenng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the character of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Article Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through

common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAHLER as negotiations chairman and myself.

The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged.

I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regulation /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. However, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders.

I shall next report on the attitude of the political circles.

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Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)